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Abstract
Recent progress in artificial intelligence (AI) raises a wide array of ethical and societal concerns. Accordingly, an appropri-
ate policy approach is urgently needed. While there has been a wave of scholarship in this field, the research community 
at times appears divided amongst those who emphasize ‘near-term’ concerns and those focusing on ‘long-term’ concerns 
and corresponding policy measures. In this paper, we seek to examine this alleged ‘gap’, with a view to understanding the 
practical space for inter-community collaboration on AI policy. We propose to make use of the principle of an ‘incompletely 
theorized agreement’ to bridge some underlying disagreements, in the name of important cooperation on addressing AI’s 
urgent challenges. We propose that on certain issue areas, scholars working with near-term and long-term perspectives can 
converge and cooperate on selected mutually beneficial AI policy projects, while maintaining their distinct perspectives.
Keywords Artificial intelligence · AI · Artificial intelligence policy · Long term · Short term · Artificial intelligence ethics · 
Cooperation models · Incompletely theorized agreement · Overlapping consensus
1 Introduction
The prevailing uncertainty around the trajectory and impact 
of artificial intelligence (AI) makes it clear that appropri-
ate technology policy approaches are urgently needed. The 
possible negative ethical and societal impacts of AI are con-
siderable: from algorithmic bias to AI-enabled surveillance, 
and from lethal autonomous weapons systems to widespread 
technology-induced unemployment. Moreover, some fore-
cast that continuing progress in AI capabilities will eventu-
ally make AI systems a ‘general-purpose technology’ [1], 
or may even enable the development of ‘high-level machine 
intelligence’ (HLMI) [2] or other ‘transformative’ capabili-
ties [3, 4]. Debate on these latter scenarios is diverse, and 
has at times focused on what some have referred to as ‘Arti-
ficial General Intelligence’ (AGI) [5]. On the surface, those 
concerned with AI’s impacts can appear divided between 
those who focus on discernible problems in the near term, 
and those who focus on more uncertain problems in the 
longer term [6–9].
This paper wants to investigate the dynamics and debates 
between these two communities, with an eye to fostering 
policy effectiveness through greater cooperation. In doing 
so, this paper seeks to take up the recent call to ‘bridge 
the near- and long-term challenges of AI’ [9]. The focus 
therefore is not on the relative urgency of existing algorith-
mic threats (such as e.g. facial recognition or algorithmic 
bias), nor on the relative plausibility of various advanced 
AI scenarios (such as e.g. HLMI or AGI), nor do we mean 
to suggest that a long-term perspective is solely focused on 
or concerned with AGI [10–12]. Rather, the paper proposes 
that even if some community divergence exists, each group’s 
overarching intention to contribute to responsible and ethi-
cal AI policy1 would benefit from cooperation within key 
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domains to maximize policy effectiveness. The paper sug-
gests that differences may be overstated, and proposes that 
even if one assume such differences, these are not practi-
cally insurmountable. Rather, it argues that the principle of 
an ‘incompletely theorized agreement’, originally derived 
from constitutional law, provides both philosophical foun-
dations and historical precedent for a form of cooperation 
between divergent communities that enables progress on 
urgent shared issues, without compromising on their respec-
tive goals.
The paper proceeds as follows: in Sect. 2, we provide a 
short rationale for our proposed intervention. We briefly lay 
out the landscape of AI policy concerns and the structure of 
the associated AI ethics and policy community. This is fol-
lowed by a discussion, drawing on historical cases as well 
as the contemporary challenges facing AI policy scholars, 
of how fragmentation within an expert community might 
hinder progress on key and urgent policies. In Sect. 3, we 
explore potential sources which could contribute to commu-
nity divergence. We touch on epistemic and methodological 
disagreements and normative disagreements, and home in on 
pragmatic disagreements around the tractability of formulat-
ing AI policy actions today which maintain long-term rel-
evance. We briefly review how serious these disagreements 
are, arguing that these trade-offs are often exaggerated, or 
do not need to preclude collaboration. Finally, in Sect. 4, we 
propose that one consolidating avenue to harness mutually 
beneficial cooperation for the purpose of effective AI policy 
could be anchored in the constitutional law principle of an 
‘incompletely theorized agreement’. This proposal works 
under the assumption that the influence of a community on 
policy making is significantly stronger if they act as a united 
front, rather than as scattered subgroups.
2  AI policy: a house divided?
Recent progress in AI has given rise to an array of ethi-
cal and societal concerns.2 Accordingly, there have been 
calls for appropriate policy measures to address these. As 
an “omni-use technology” [13], AI has both potential for 
good [14–16] as well as for bad [17–19] applications. The 
latter include: various forms of pervasive algorithmic bias 
[20, 21], challenges around transparency and explainability 
[22, 23]; the safety of autonomous vehicles and other cyber-
physical systems [24], or the potential of AI systems to be 
used in (or be susceptible to) malicious or criminal attacks 
[25–27]; the erosion of democracy through e.g. ‘computa-
tional propaganda’ or ‘deep fakes’ [28–30], and an array 
of threats to the full range of human rights [31, 32]. The 
latter may eventually cumulate in the possible erosion of 
the global legal order by the comparative empowerment of 
authoritarian states [33, 34]. Finally, some express concern 
that continued technological progress might eventually result 
in increasingly more ‘transformative’ AI capabilities [3], up 
to and including AGI. Indeed, a number of AI researchers 
expect some variation of ‘high-level machine intelligence’ 
to be achieved within the next five decades [2]. Some have 
suggested that if those transformative capabilities are not 
handled with responsibility and care, such developments 
could well result in new and potential catastrophic risks to 
the welfare, autonomy, or even long-term survival of socie-
ties [35, 36].
Looking at the current debate and scholarship involved in 
the aforementioned areas, we note, along with other scholars 
[6, 8, 37], that there appears to be a fuzzy split, along a tem-
poral ‘near-term’/‘long-term’ axis. This perception matters 
because, as in many other fields and contexts, a perceived or 
experienced distinction may eventually become a self-fulfill-
ing prophecy [38]. This holds true even if the perceived dif-
ferences are based on misperceptions or undue simplification 
by popular scientific media [39–41]. Of course, fragmenta-
tion between near- and longer-term considerations of AI’s 
impact is only one way to explore the growing community, 
and it may not be the sole issue to overcome to maximize 
policy impact. However, for the purpose of this paper, our 
focus is on this specific gap.
2.1  The policy advantages of collaboration: lessons 
from history
The current AI ethics and policy community is a young one. 
Policy shifts, on the other hand, take time. As such, it is dif-
ficult to clearly outline what impact current dynamics have. 
We are, after all, still in the early stages of these develop-
ments. Nevertheless, historical examples of adjacent fields 
can help to demonstrate and forecast how fragmentation, 
or, conversely cooperation, on policy goals within the AI 
ethics and policy community could strengthen impact on 
technology policy.
Why should potential fragmentation along an axis such 
as near- and longer-term concerns worry us? History shows 
that the structure of a field or community affects the ability 
of its members to shape and influence policy downstream. 
Importantly, it shows that there is significant benefit derived 
from collaboration. We put forward three historic examples 
of adjacent technology policy fields to AI, meaning those 
that tackled equally new and emerging technologies. We 
briefly highlight one case where fragmentation may have 
contributed to a negative impact on the overall policy impact 
2 This paper perceives AI’s ethical and societal concerns to be 
closely intertwined, and as such refers to the broader set of these 
actual and potential concerns throughout.
Footnote 1 (continued)
assumption that policy making can positively influence the develop-
ment and deployment of AI technology.
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of the community and two cases where a collaborative effort 
yielded a positive impact on policy formulation.
2.1.1  Nanotechnology
One community that arguably suffered from a public pursuit 
of fractious division was the nanotechnology community 
in the early 2000s [42, 43]. Internal disagreements came 
to a head in the 2003 ‘Drexler-Smalley’ debate [44], which 
cemented an oversimplified public caricature of the field. 
Scholars reviewing this incident have argued that ‘para-sci-
entific’ media created “polarizing controversy that attracted 
audiences and influenced policy and scientific research agen-
das. […] bounding nanotechnology as a field-in-tension by 
structuring irreconcilable dichotomies out of an ambiguous 
set of uncertainties.” [38]. This showcases a missed oppor-
tunity within a fragmented community to come together to 
promote greater political engagement with the responsible 
development of the technology.
2.1.2  Recombinant DNA
In the 1970s, concerns arose over recombinant DNA (rDNA) 
technology. In particular, the ethical implications of the abil-
ity to reshape life, as well as fears over potential biohazards 
from new infectious diseases led the biotechnology com-
munity to come together at the 1975 Asilomar Conference 
on Recombinant DNA to set shared standards [45]. The con-
ference is widely considered a landmark in the field [46]: 
the scientist’s and lawyers’ commitment to a forthright open 
and public discussion has been argued to have stimulated 
both public interest and grounded policymaker discussion 
about the social, political and environmental issues related 
to genetic biotechnology in medicine and agriculture [47].
2.1.3  Ballistic missile defense arms control
In the wake of the creation of the atom bomb, a number of 
scientists expressed dismay and sought to institutionalize 
global control of these weapons. Early efforts to this end, 
such as the 1946 Baruch Plan, proved unsuccessful [48, 49]. 
However, by the 1950s–1960s, a new ‘epistemic community’ 
emerged, bringing together both technical and social scien-
tists, specifically in opposition to the development of anti-
ballistic missile (ABM) systems. This community proved 
able to develop and disseminate this new understanding of 
nuclear deterrence dynamics to policymakers [50]. They 
achieved this by maintaining a high level of consensus on 
concrete policy goals, by framing public discourse on the 
ethical goals, and by fostering links to both policymakers as 
well as to Soviet scientists. This allowed them to persuade 
key administration figures and shift policymaker norms and 
perceptions at home and internationally. Ultimately, setting 
the stage for the 1972 ABM Treaty, the first arms control 
agreement of this kind [50, 51].
2.2  The pitfalls of fragmented efforts in AI Policy
While some of the historical context is surely different, a 
number of these historical dynamics may well transfer to 
the emerging AI ethics and policy community [52]. Those 
concerned with AI policy could benefit from exploring such 
historical lessons. This should be done with urgency, for 
two reasons.
First, there is a closing window of opportunity. The field 
of AI policy is a relatively new one, which offers a degree 
of flexibility in terms of problem framings, governance 
instrument choice and design, and community alignment. 
Going forwards, however, this field has a high likelihood 
of becoming progressively more rigid as framings, public 
perceptions, and stakeholder interests crystallize. Current 
dynamics could, therefore, have far-reaching impacts, given 
the potential to lock in a range of path-dependencies, for 
example through particular framings of the issues at hand 
[53]. In this context, a divided community which potentially 
treats policymakers or public attention as a zero-sum good 
for competing policy projects may compromise the legiti-
macy of its individual efforts in front of these. This could 
undercut the leverage of policy initiatives today and in the 
future. Worse, public quarrels or contestation may ‘poison 
the well’. Policymakers may begin to perceive and treat a 
divided community as a series of interest groups rather than 
an ‘epistemic community’ with a multi-faceted but coherent 
agenda for beneficial societal impact of AI. Finally, from a 
policy perspective, it is important to note that while current 
regulatory initiatives are and should not always be directly 
transferable to future issues, neither are they categorically 
irrelevant. As such, they can often provide the second-best 
tools for rapidly confronting new AI challenges. This has its 
own pitfalls, but is often superior to waiting out the slow and 
reactive formulation of new policies.
Moreover, the risks are concrete and timely. It is plausible 
that political moods will shift within the coming years and 
decades, in ways that make policy progress much harder. 
Furthermore, it is possible that other epistemic communi-
ties may converge and mobilize faster to embed and insti-
tutionalize alternative, less broadly beneficial framings of 
AI. Indeed, public and global framings of AI in recent years 
have seemed to drift towards narratives of competition and 
‘arms races’ [54–56, but see also 57]. An inflection point 
for how societies use and relate to AI may eventually be 
reached. Missing such a window of opportunity could mean 
that the relative influence of those concerned with making 
the impact of AI beneficial (whether in the near or longer 
term) will decline, right as their voices are needed most. 
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Conversely, many gains secured today could have lasting 
benefits down the road.
3  Examining potential grounds 
for divergence
There are a range of factors that could contribute to the clus-
tering into fuzzy ‘near-’ and ‘long-term’ communities, and 
different scholars may hold distinct and overlapping sets of 
beliefs on them [cf. 8]. In the following paragraphs, we pro-
vide our first attempt at mapping some of these factors.3
Some part of the divergence may be due to varying epis-
temic or methodological commitments. These could reflect 
varying levels of tolerance regarding scientific uncer-
tainty and distinct views on the threshold of probability 
required before far-reaching action or further investigation 
is warranted. This means that concerns surrounding AI may 
depend on qualitatively different conceptions of ‘acceptable 
uncertainty’ for each group of observers. This may well be 
hard to resolve. Moreover, epistemic differences over the 
implicit or explicit disagreements of the modal standards in 
these debates, for example, debates over what types of data 
or arguments are admissible in establishing or contesting the 
plausibility or probability of risk from AI may contribute 
to further divergence. This could even lead to differential 
interpretations of evidence that are available. For instance, 
do empirically observed failure modes of present-day archi-
tectures [58–61] provide small-scale proof-of-concepts of 
the type of difficulties we might one day encounter in AI 
‘value alignment’, or are such extrapolations unwarranted?
For our purposes, however, the most salient factor may be 
essentially pragmatic. Different perceptions of the empiri-
cal dynamics and path-dependencies of governing AI can 
inform distinct theories-of-change. These are intertwined 
with one’s expectations about the tractability and relevance 
of formulating useful and resilient policy action today. In 
this context, Prunkl and Whittlestone [8] have recently 
argued that a more accurate picture and more productive dia-
logue could be achieved if scholars differentiated amongst 
the four dimensions on which views vary, in terms of the 
capabilities, impacts, certainty or extremity of AI systems. 
They emphasize that views on each of these questions fall 
on a spectrum. Taking this point on board, there are addi-
tional ways to cash out possible divergences. One debate 
might concern the question, how long-lasting are the con-
sequences of near-term AI issues? If those that care about 
the longer term are convinced that these issues will not have 
long-lasting consequences, or that they would eventually be 
swamped by the much larger trends and issues [3], then this 
could lead them to discount work on near-term AI problems. 
However, it is important to note that near-term issues are 
likely to considerably affect the degree to which society is 
vulnerable to longer-term dangers posed by future advanced 
AI systems. Short-term or medium-term issues [7, 37] can 
easily increase society’s general turbulence [62], or lock in 
counterproductive framings of AI or our relation to it. In 
general, we might expect many nominally near-term effects 
of AI on society (such as in surveillance; job automation; 
military capabilities) to scale up and become more disrup-
tive as AI capabilities gradually increase [18, 37]. Indeed, 
some longer-term scholars have argued that advanced AI 
capabilities considerably below the level of HLMI might 
already suffice to achieve a ‘prepotence’ which could pose 
catastrophic risks [10]. This would make mid-term impacts 
particularly important to handle, and collaboration between 
different groups on at least some generalizable projects 
crucial.
Another pragmatic question or concern is over how much 
leverage we have today to meaningfully shape policies that 
will be applicable or relevant in the long term, especially 
if AI architectures or the broader political and regulatory 
environment change a lot in the meantime [8]. Some scholars 
may hold that future AI systems will be technically so dif-
ferent from today’s AI architectures that research into this 
question undertaken today will not be relevant, or they might 
hold that such advanced AI capabilities may be so remote 
that the regulatory environment will have changed too much 
for meaningful policy work to be conducted right now [63]. 
These people might argue that we had better wait until things 
are clearer and we are in a better position to understand 
whether and what research is needed or meaningful.
In practice, this critique does not appear to be a very com-
mon or deeply held position. Indeed, as a trade-off it may 
be overstated. It is plausible that there are diverse areas on 
which both communities can undertake valuable research 
today, because the shelf life of current policy and research 
efforts might be longer than is assumed. To be sure, there 
is still significant uncertainty over whether current AI 
approaches can at all be scaled up to very advanced perfor-
mance [64–66]. Nonetheless, research could certainly depart 
from a range of areas of overlap [67] and shared areas of 
concern [68, 69], as we will discuss shortly.
Moreover, policy making is informed by a variety of 
aspects which range across different time spans. Starting 
with political agendas that often reflect the current status 
quo, policy making is equally shaped by shifting public 
discourse, societal dynamics and high-impact shocks. The 
latter factor has played a key role in AI policy, where high-
profile incidents involving algorithmic discrimination, lack 
3 It should be emphasized that this mapping is only an indicative 
sketch, and would be much enriched by further examination, for 
example through structured interviews or comprehensive opinion sur-
veys.
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of transparency, or surveillance have driven policy shifts, as 
seen for example in the pushback on discriminatory algo-
rithms used in the UK visa selection processes [70], the 
Artificial Intelligence Video Interview Act regulating the 
use of AI in employee interviews, or the California B.O.T. 
Law requiring AI systems to self-identify [71, 72].
In sum, it is plausible that many perceived ‘barriers’ 
to inter-community cooperation on policy are not all that 
strong, and that many ‘tradeoffs’ are likewise overempha-
sized. However, does that mean there are also positive, 
mutually productive opportunities for both communities to 
work on with regard to policy in spite of outstanding disa-
greements? What would such an agreement look like?
4  Towards ‘incompletely theorized 
agreements’ for AI policy
Above, we have reviewed potential sources for divergence 
within the community. We will now discuss how even in the 
context of apparent disagreement, pragmatic agreements on 
shared policy goals and norms could be reached.
We propose to adopt and adapt the legal principle of an 
‘incompletely theorized agreement’ for this purpose. Legal 
scholarship in constitutional law and regulation has long 
theorized the legal, organizational and societal importance 
of such incompletely theorized agreements. Their key use 
is that they allow a given community to bypass or suspend 
[73, 74] any theoretical disagreement on matters where (1) 
the disagreement appears relatively intractable and (2) there 
is an urgent need to address certain shared practical issues. 
Disagreements are intractable in cases where either it simply 
does not appear as if the question will be decisively resolved 
one way or the other in the near term, or where there is 
limited time and capacity to reason through all underlying 
disagreements [73]. Incompletely theorized agreements can 
therefore apply to deep philosophical and ethical questions 
as much as to contexts of pervasive scientific uncertainty. 
The latter is especially the case on questions where it still 
remains unclear where and how we might procure the infor-
mation that allows definitive resolution.
Incompletely theorized agreements are a fundamental 
component to well-functioning legal systems, societies, and 
organizations. They allow for stability and flexibility to get 
urgent things done [75]. These agreements have long played 
a key role in constitutional and administrative law, and have 
made possible numerous landmark achievements of global 
governance, such as the establishment of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights [75, 76]. The framework has 
also been extended to other domains, such as the collective 
development and analysis of health-care policies in the face 
of pluralism and conflicting views [77].
Incompletely theorized agreements have broad similari-
ties with the notion of an ‘overlapping consensus’, devel-
oped by John Rawls, which refers to the way adherents of 
different (and apparently inconsistent) normative doctrines 
can nonetheless converge on particular principles of justice 
to underwrite the shared political community [78]. This 
concept has been read as a key mechanism in the field of 
bioethics, serving to enable agreement despite different 
fundamental outlooks [79]. It also already plays a role in 
the existing literature on computer ethics [80], as well as 
in the field of intercultural information ethics [81]. Indeed, 
overlapping consensus has been proposed as a mechanism 
on which to ground global cooperation on AI policy across 
cultural lines [82].
If overlapping consensus can ground inter-cultural coop-
eration, incompletely theorized agreements might serve as 
a similar foundation for practical cooperation between near- 
and long-term perspectives. In a related context, Baum has 
suggested that policy interventions aimed at securing long-
term resilience to various catastrophes can often involve sig-
nificant co-benefits in the near term, and so do not narrowly 
depend on all parties agreeing on the deep reasons for the 
policies proposed [83]. Could incompletely theorized agree-
ments ground cooperation amongst AI policy communities? 
We suggest that they could.
4.1  Incompletely theorized agreements in AI policy: 
examples and sketches
There are a range of issue areas where both groups could 
likely locate joint questions they would want addressed, 
and shared goals for which particular AI policies should be 
implemented. This holds even if their underlying reasons 
for pursuing these are not fully aligned. Without intending 
to provide an exhaustive, in-depth or definitive overview, a 
brief survey might highlight various areas for cooperation.
For one, gaining insight into- and leverage on the general 
levers of policy formation around AI [52] is a key prior-
ity. What are the steps in the policymaking process which 
determine what issues get raised to political agendas and 
eventually acted upon, and which might be derailed by other 
coalitions [84]? Given the above, research into underlying 
social and societal developments is fruitful to advance all 
groups’ ability to navigate mutually agreeable policy goals 
across this policy making cycle [85]. Likewise, research into 
when, where or why global AI governance institutions might 
become vulnerable to regulatory capture or institutional path 
dependency ought to be an important consideration, what-
ever one’s AI concerns are [86, 87].
On a more operational level, this can feed into joint inves-
tigation into the relative efficacy of various policy levers for 
AI governance. For example, insights into when and how AI 
research labs or individual researchers adopt, or alternately 
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cut corners on, responsible and accountable AI, or the incen-
tivization of shifts in workplace culture or employee norms, 
could shape the policy proposals the community might 
make. The question of how to promote prosocial norms in AI 
research environments is of core interest to both communi-
ties with an eye to technology policy [88]. This might cover, 
e.g. whether to publicly name problematic performance (e.g. 
biased results; lack of safety) in commercial AI products 
results in tech companies actually correcting the systems 
[89]; or whether codes of ethics are effective at changing 
programmers’ decision making on the working floor [90, 
91]. All of these could be fruitful areas of collaboration on 
eventual policy proposals for either community.
More specifically, there are a range of particular AI policy 
programs that we expect could be the site of an incompletely 
theorized agreement.
1. Incompletely theorized agreements could shape norms 
and policy debates over the appropriate scientific cul-
ture for considering the impact and dissemination of AI 
research [92, 93], especially where it concerns AI appli-
cations with potentially salient misuses. The underly-
ing reasons for such policies might differ. Some may be 
concerned over abuses of vulnerable populations, new 
vectors for criminal exploitation or the implications of 
new language models for misinformation [94, 95]; and 
others over the long-term risks from the eventual open 
development of advanced AI systems [96]. Accordingly, 
incompletely theorized agreements in this area could 
converge on policies to shape researcher norms around 
improved precaution or reflection around the impact or 
potential misuse of research [97].
2. Another example might be found in the domain of the 
global regulation of military uses of AI. This area has 
already seen years of shared efforts and even collab-
oration amongst a coalition of activists, lawyers, and 
institutions departing from both a near-term as well as 
longer-term perspective, such as the Future of Life Insti-
tute [52].
3. Incompletely theorized agreements could ground pro-
ductive policy cooperation on policy interventions 
aimed at preserving the integrity of public discourse 
and informed decision-making in the face of AI systems. 
Policies aimed at combating AI-enabled disinformation 
would be a natural site for incompletely theorized col-
laboration, because a society’s epistemic security [98] is 
relevant from both a near-term and long-term perspec-
tive alike.
4. Similarly, incompletely theorized agreements surround-
ing the promotion of policies aimed at securing citizens’ 
(political) autonomy and independence from unaccount-
able perception control could be promising. After all, 
practices of opaque technological management [99] 
or perception control [100] can enable authorities to 
increasingly shape individuals’ and societies’ behaviour 
and values. Regulation to restrict the deployment of such 
tools, to facilitate privacy-preserving AI, or to ensure 
transparency and accountability of the principals of such 
tools, are important from a near-term perspective con-
cerned with the role of ‘hyper nudges’ [101], algocracy 
[102], or surveillance capitalism [103]. Simultaneously, 
such policies are also critical to avert long-term worries 
over a ‘value lock-in’, whereby one generation or party 
might someday “invent a technology that will enable the 
agents alive at that time to maintain their values indefi-
nitely into the future, controlling the broad sweep of the 
entire rest of the future of civilisation” [104].
Although the underlying motives for each group to pursue 
policies on the abovementioned domains may be partially 
distinct, these technical differences are arguably thwarted 
by the benefits derived from achieving impactful and effec-
tive policy measures together. In many of these cases, the 
practical benefits of an incompletely theorized agreement 
would be at least fourfold (1) to reduce public confusion 
around these topics; (2) to present policymakers with an 
epistemic community delivering integrated policy propos-
als; (3) to support the articulation of regulations or govern-
ance instruments for specific policy problems, which need 
not assume further advances in AI capabilities, but which 
are also not reliant on provisions or assumptions that are 
vulnerable to ‘obsolescence’ if or when such advances do 
occur [105–107], giving such policies a longer shelf life; (4) 
to improve engagement of particular AI policies with the 
steadily increasing cross-domain nature of AI, which could 
help inform regulatory responses across domains. This is 
especially relevant because different fields (such as content 
moderation, health-care, or the military) often confront dif-
ferent yet similar versions of underlying problems [108].
4.2  Limitations of incompletely theorized 
agreements
We do not wish to suggest that incompletely theorized agree-
ments are an unambiguously valuable tool across all AI 
policy cases, or even a definite solution for any one policy 
case. Such agreements do suffer from a number of potential 
drawbacks or trade-offs, which both communities should 
consider before invoking them in any particular case.4
First, depending on one’s assumptions around the 
expected degree of change in AI or in its societal impacts, 
incompletely theorized agreements could prove brittle. 
4 We thank one reviewer for prompting this discussion of the draw-
backs of incompletely theorized agreements.
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Incompletely theorized agreements bypass a full examina-
tion of the underlying disagreements to facilitate pragmatic 
and swift action on particular policies on which both com-
munities find themselves in practical alignment in a specific 
moment in time. This may create a lack of clarity over the 
boundary conditions of that practical agreement, along with 
opacity over whether, or where (i.e. for which future par-
ticular questions around AI policy) the practical agreement 
might suddenly break down for either or all parties.
Second, an incompletely theorized agreement is, in an 
important sense, a ‘stopgap’ measure more than a general 
ideal or permanent fix. As discussed above, an incompletely 
theorized agreement might be most suited to situations 
where (a) practical policy action is urgently needed, and 
(b) underlying theoretical agreement by stakeholders on all 
engaged principles or questions does not seem close. How-
ever, over longer timeframes, deeper inquiry and debate do 
appear necessary [73]. In addition, there is always the pos-
sibility that agreement was not, in fact, intractable within the 
near term. As such, a premature leap by the community into 
an incompletely theorized agreement to achieve some policy 
X might inadvertently curb the very conversations amongst 
the communities which could have led both to eventually 
prefer policy Y instead, had their conversation been allowed 
to run its course.
Moreover, there is a key related point here, on which we 
should reflect. By advocating for the adoption of incom-
pletely theorized agreements on AI policy today, we our-
selves are in a sense assuming or importing an implicit 
judgment about the urgency of AI issues today, and about 
the intractability of the underlying debates. Yet these are 
two positions which others might contest. For example, by 
arguing that ‘AI issues do not today meet that threshold of 
urgency that the use of an incompletely theorized agreement 
is warranted’. We wish to make this assumption explicit. At 
the same time, we expect that it is an assumption widely 
shared by many scholars working on AI policy, many of 
whom may well share a sense that the coming years will be 
a sensitive and even critical time for AI policies.
Third, a sloppily formulated incompletely theorized 
agreement on an AI policy issue may not actually reflect 
convergence on particular policies (e.g. ‘certification scheme 
for AI products with safety tests X, Y, Z’). Instead, it might 
solidify on apparent agreement on vague mid-level princi-
ples or values (e.g. ‘AI developers should ensure responsible 
AI development’). These may be so broad that they do not 
ground clear action at the level of actual policies. If this 
were to happen, incompletely theorized agreements might 
merely risk contributing to the already-abundant prolifera-
tion of broad AI principles or ethical frameworks on AI that 
have little direct policy impact. While the ecosystem of AI 
codes of ethics issued in recent years have certainly shown 
some convergence [109–111], they have been critiqued as 
being hard to operationalize, and for providing only the 
appearance of agreement while masking underlying ten-
sions in the principles’ interpretation, operationalization, 
or practical requirements [93, 112]. Situations where an 
incompletely theorized agreement does not manage to root 
itself at the level of concrete policies but only mid-level prin-
ciples would be a worst-of-both-worlds scenario: it would 
reduce the ability of actors to openly reflect upon and resolve 
inconsistencies amongst- or disagreements about high-level 
principles, while not even affording improvements at facili-
tating concrete policies or actions in particular AI domains. 
To mitigate this risk, incompletely theorized agreements 
should, therefore, remain closely grounded in concrete and 
clearly actionable policy goals or outputs.
Nonetheless, while limitations such as these should be 
considered in greater detail, we argue that they do not cat-
egorically erode the case for implementing, or at least fur-
ther examining the promise of this principle and tool for 
advancing responsible AI policy.
5  Conclusion
AI has raised multiple societal and ethical concerns. This 
highlights the urgent need for suitable and impactful policy 
measures in response. Nonetheless, there is at present an 
experienced fragmentation in the responsible AI policy 
community, amongst clusters of scholars focusing on ‘near-
term’ AI risks, and those focusing on ‘longer-term’ risks. 
This paper has sought to map the practical space for inter-
community collaboration, with a view towards the practical 
development of AI policy.
As such, we briefly provided a rationale for such col-
laboration, by reviewing historical cases of scientific com-
munity conflict or collaboration, as well as the contemporary 
challenges facing AI policy. We argued that fragmentation 
within a given community can hinder progress on key and 
urgent policies. Consequently, we reviewed a number of 
potential (epistemic, normative or pragmatic) sources of 
disagreement in the AI ethics community, and argued that 
these trade-offs are often exaggerated, and at any rate do 
not need to preclude collaboration. On this basis, we pre-
sented the novel proposal for drawing on the constitutional 
law principle of an ‘incompletely theorized agreement’, for 
the communities to set aside or suspend these and other 
disagreements for the purpose of achieving higher-order 
AI policy goals of both communities in selected areas. We, 
therefore, non-exhaustively discussed a number of promis-
ing shared AI policy areas which could serve as the sites for 
such agreements, while also discussing some of the overall 
limits of this framework.
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This paper does not suggest that communities should 
fully merge or ignore differences whatever their source 
may be. To be sure, some policy projects will be relevant to 
one group within the community but not the other. Indeed, 
community heterogeneity and diversity is generally a good 
thing for a scientific paradigm. Instead, the paper proposes 
to question some possible reasons for conflicting dynamics 
which could stall positive progress for policy making, and 
suggests an avenue for a higher-order resolution. Most of 
all, the paper hopes to pragmatically encourage the explo-
ration of opportunities for shared work and suggested that 
work on such opportunities, where it is found, can be well 
grounded through an incompletely theorized agreement. We 
invite scholars in the ethical AI community to explore the 
strengths and limits of this tool.
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